is foundational a priori justification indispensable?
ted poston 1 poston@southalabama.edu abstract Laurence BonJour's (1985) coherence theory of empirical knowledge relies heavily on a traditional foundationalist theory of a priori knowledge. He argues that a foundationalist, rationalist theory of a priori justication is indispensable for a coherence theory. BonJour (1998) continues this theme, arguing that a traditional account of a priori justication is indispensable for the justication of putative a priori truths, the justication of any non-observational belief and the justication of reasoning itself. While BonJour's indispensability arguments have received some critical discussion (Gendler 2001; Harman 2001; Beebe 2008) , no one has investigated the indispensability arguments from a coherentist perspective. This perspective offers a fruitful take on BonJour's arguments, because he does not appreciate the depth of the coherentist alternative to the traditional empiricist-rationalist debate. This is surprising on account of BonJour's previous defense of coherentism. Two signicant conclusions emerge: rst, BonJour's indispensability arguments beg central questions about an explanationist form of coherentism; second, BonJour's original defense of coherentism took on board certain assumptions that inevitably led to the demise of his form of coherentism. The positive conclusion of this article is that explanatory coherentism is more coherent than BonJour's indispensability arguments assume, and more coherent than BonJour's earlier coherentist epistemology.
Laurence BonJour (1998) argues for a rationalist position according to which pure reason can discover substantive truths about the world. Rationalism has been dominant throughout the history of philosophy, but in recent years the development of philosophical naturalism has diminished its prestige. Naturalism holds that reason's putative grasp of these truths can either be explained away in terms of convention or dismissed entirely. The rst move explains reason's putative grasp of these claims in terms of denitions and trivial implications between synonyms. This view is associated with moderate empiricism. The other naturalist move takes aim against the distinctions and concepts upon which the traditional debate over the a priori relies on. BonJour focuses on Quine's radical empiricism in this connection. One of the themes I return to is that BonJour doesn't adequately appreciate the depth of Quine's criticism of the traditional rationalist-empiricist debate.I restrict my attention to BonJour's indispensability arguments. He argues that unless one is a radical skeptic about justication, there must be some substantive a priori justication (1998, 3) . BonJour refers to this argument as 'the master argument' of his book (2001b, 626) . He argues that unless there is some substantive a priori justication, then no reasoning is ever justied and no one is ever justied in believing any claim that transcends experience. My primary aim is to rebut these arguments. There is a gap in BonJour's indispensability arguments that undermines their force. This lacuna corresponds to BonJour's failure to mine the depths of explanatory coherentism. My main task will be to explain this explanationist alternative in the context of responding to BonJour's indispensability arguments. In contrast to BonJour's avowals, explanatory coherentism is a coherent and plausible account of the a priori.
At the outset I want to make it clear that I will not be arguing for the connection between naturalism and explanatory coherentism. These positions develop within Quine's philosophy, and Quine's naturalism can be seen as developing out of explanatory coherentism. In my estimation, much contemporary work on philosophical naturalism can be interpreted as extending explanatory coherentism. But it is outside the scope of this article to defend these claims. 2 My primary purpose is to defend the coherence of an explanationist treatment of the a priori from BonJour's criticisms. I also want to distinguish my argument from a Quinean indispensability argument for the a priori. A Quinean indispensability argument aims to show that apparently a priori truths are justied by being embedded in a broader theory that has signicant empirical conrmation. This kind of argument has come under signicant re. 3 I do not intend to enter the fray over the merits of this Quinean argument. Rather, I argue for a position much closer to Goodman's justication of inductive and deductive rules. 4 We start with various beliefs about the necessity of certain claims and by reasoning in a coherentist fashion come to have justication for believing that these claims are true. The argument I develop is compatible with our being justied in believing various branches of higher mathematics that are not embedded in any successful empirical theory. Our justication for these branches of mathematics consists in their overall coherence.
bonjour's indispensability arguments
BonJour argues that substantive a priori justication is indispensable for three reasons. First, there are putative a priori truths like 2 + 2 = 4 and nothing can be both entirely green and red at the same time. BonJour argues that only a rationalist view of the a priori can account for their justication. Secondly, there are claims that transcend immediate experience. Nothing in my current experience indicates that I was asleep last night, but I am currently justied in believing this. BonJour contends that only a rationalist conception of the a priori can account for the justication of these claims. Thirdly, BonJour claims, reasoning itself requires robust a priori justication. Even a simple application of modus ponens requires a grasp of its goodness, and only a rationalist view can provide suitable justication for it.
Each indispensability argument raises signicant challenges for an explanationist who claims that the justication of any claim is a function of how well the belief fares with respect to the explanatory virtues -simplicity, testability, fruitfulness, scope and conservativeness. In the following I tackle BonJour's indispensability arguments. I begin with his argument concerning observation-transcendent claims, because our discussion of these issues will carry over to the other indispensability arguments.
Observation-transcendent inference
Many beliefs concern matters removed from present experience. I believe that the Battle of Hastings occurred in 1066, that it will rain somewhere in England over the next week and that many people are presently asleep. These beliefs are not based on current observation, but concern matters in the distant past, in the future and about presently unobserved events. Call beliefs like these 'observation-transcendent beliefs' or simply 'transcendent beliefs'. How are transcendent beliefs justied? BonJour claims that these beliefs are justied only if some substantive a priori beliefs are justied. What is his argument for this claim?
BonJour begins with the supposition that some beliefs are justied entirely on the basis of present experience. Call beliefs of this kind 'immanent beliefs'. According to this assumption, one's belief that there is a red, circular disk directly ahead is justied entirely on the basis of one's current visual experience; one need not have justication for any transcendent beliefs to be justied in this belief. BonJour assumes that immanent beliefs provide the starting points for the justication of transcendent beliefs. He then assumes that the inferences from immanent beliefs to transcendent beliefs must be based on principles that are justied a priori (BonJour 1998, 4) . According to BonJour, the only way to resist this conclusion is by thinking that experience provides the links between immanent beliefs and transcendent beliefs. But transcendent claims require something besides experience to have justication, which BonJour concludes must be supplied by the a priori. 5 BonJour's argument assumes a traditional foundationalist view, according to which some beliefs are properly basic, and the remaining (non-basic) beliefs are justied only if they are properly related to the basic beliefs. Within this conception of justication, it is difcult to see how the transitions or inferences involved in observation-transcendent inference could come from experience. However natural BonJour's line of reasoning appears, his conclusion depends crucially on the assumptions that (1) there is a clear distinction between observational and non-observational beliefs and (2) non-observational beliefs are justied by being inferred from observational beliefs. These assumptions lend more credibility to BonJour's argument than it actually has.
Consider the distinction between observational and non-observational beliefs. BonJour glosses over this distinction by way of a rough characterization of beliefs based on direct experience. These beliefs are 'particular rather than general in their content and are conned to situations observable at specic and fairly narrowly delineated places and times ' (1998, 3-4) . This characterization implies that when one observes a piece of litmus paper turning red and believes that this liquid is acidic, then that belief is a direct observational belief. But, plainly, this is not a direct observational belief.
What, then, is a direct observational belief? This is a difcult question, and BonJour cannot simply assume there is a principled distinction between observation and inference in an argument for traditional rationalism. One source of resistance to traditional foundationalism involves precisely this point. Wilfrid Sellars has argued that a subject must have theoretical beliefs in order to entertain observational beliefs (Sellars 1963, Sections 3, 8 and 12) . Furthermore, evidence from cognitive psychology and the history of science strongly suggests that higher-level cognition signicantly inuences lower-level information processing (Brewer and Lambert 2001 ). BonJour's indispensability argument gains considerably more plausibility than it has by ignoring this crucial issue. If transcendent beliefs are necessary conditions for immanent beliefs, then the justication of immanent beliefs is not simple and straightforward. Moreover, if it is true that the content of every belief is inuenced by theory, then there is no basis for identifying a subset of our beliefs as the epistemically privileged ones by which all other beliefs must be justied. In place of this, one may adopt Neurath's claim: each belief has some presumption in its favor and should be abandoned only to improve one's overall doxastic position. 6 It is therefore no surprise, in this connection, that epistemic conservatism arose alongside the realization that theory was always involved in any attempt to determine what one should believe.
Putative a priori truths and the parade argument
The strongest case for a substantive doctrine of the a priori appeals to apparently selfevident a priori claims. Consider the following list of putative a priori claims. 7
1. No surface can be uniformly red and uniformly blue at the same time. 2. No statement can be both true and false at the same time and in the same respect. 3. Everything is identical to itself. 4. If the conclusion of an inductive argument is contingent, it is possible for the premises of that argument to be true and its conclusion to be false. 5. 2 + 3 = 5 is necessarily true. This is an impressive parade of seemingly obvious a priori truths. Indeed, BonJour remarks, 'it is no accident that the vast majority of historical philosophers, from Plato on down to Leibniz and Locke, would have regarded this general line of argument as both obvious and conclusive, so much so that the issue of whether there is a priori justi-cation scarcely arises for them at all' (BonJour 1998, 2) . Yet, what is this 'line of argument'? BonJour intends to elicit the response that there is substantive a priori justication by parading before one's view standard cases of a priori truths. Let us call this 'the parade argument'. BonJour recognizes that this argument is not entirely convincing given the formulation of non-Euclidean geometries and the rise of moderate and radical empiricist accounts of the a priori. To properly appreciate the force of the parade argument one must clear away confusions that encumber the argument. BonJour seeks to accomplish this task by arguing against moderate and radical empiricism. 8 After having removed obstacles to the parade, BonJour holds that one can grasp, directly and immediately, that these claims are true in such a way that requires substantive a priori justication.
What should the explanationist say about the parade argument? The explanationist should preface an answer with two general remarks. First, because the parade argument is intended to support rationalism it is not sufcient that the examples illustrate the necessity of non-experiential justication. As we saw above the distinction between observational truths and transcendent truths is philosophically dubious. Each claim is justied only if some non-experiential claims are justied. It comes as no surprise to the coherentist that there must be non-experiential justication. This is a central coherentist theme: every belief, insofar as it is justied, requires non-experiential justication. But the justication comes not from some mysterious faculty that supposedly directly grasps necessary features of reality, but rather from explanatory considerations. Thus, BonJour needs to argue that once the conceptual terrain is claried, we clearly see that we grasp these truths with direct immediate insight.
Second, discussions over the status of putative a priori truths are often confused with whether putative a priori claims are possibly false. Of course, to show that a putative a priori claim is possibly false is to thereby show that one did not grasp the necessity of the claim. Harman (2001) , for instance, raises possibilities that threaten the necessity of various examples of the putative a priori. BonJour replies that Harman is not making any sense or is changing the subject. This quick descent to brute intuition about whether a statement is genuinely necessary (or, even cognitively signicant) should be avoided if possible. My strategy is to grant to the rationalist that many putative a priori claims are necessary truths (or, at least that the balance of evidence indicates so). I then inquire about the epistemology of putative necessary claims. I argue, however, that the parade argument does not support a foundationalist epistemology.
The pivotal issue is over the autonomy, or singularity, of rational insight. BonJour claims that the rationalist is committed to the autonomy of rational insight. He writes, 'According to the moderate rationalist position, each instance of apparent rational insight or apparent self evidence, each alleged case of a priori justication, should be construed as epistemically autonomous, as dependent on nothing beyond itself for its justication ' (1998, 146, emphasis added) . The autonomy of apparent rational insight does not imply that apparent rational insight is indefeasible. Rather, as BonJour acknowledges, apparent rational insight can be undermined 'by further a priori reection, by considerations of coherence, or by (partly) empirical considerations ' (1998, 146) . Even so, an initial, apparent grasp of the necessity of a claim is sufcient, all by itself, to justify one in believing the claim.
What exactly is an autonomous rational insight? Is it a matter of thinking that a claim must be true without having any idea why it's true? Is it as if one has the thought that, e.g.
'nothing can be both entirely red and green at the same time' along with an indescribable conviction that this must be so? This is Alvin Plantinga's conception of basic a priori beliefs. Plantinga holds that basic a priori beliefs are ones in which you are utterly convinced that they are true and could not be false (1993, 105) . Furthermore, these convictions are accompanied by an indescribable feel that is often indicated by saying one 'sees ' it (1993, 105) . BonJour resists Plantinga's characterization of basic rational insights, writing that the conviction based on rational insight is not 'as Plantinga seems to suggest, a matter of a conviction of necessity accompanied by some peculiar, indescribable f o u n d at i o n a l a p r i o r i j u st i f i c at i o n e p i s t e m e v o l u m e 10-3phenomenology' (BonJour 1998, 108, fn12) . Rather, BonJour explains that 'I at least seem to myself to see with perfect clarity just why this proposition holds and even to be able to articulate this insight to some extent ' (1998, 108) . BonJour expands, writing about the proposition that nothing can be both entirely red and green at the same time:
It is in the nature of both redness and greenness to exclusively occupy the surface or area that instantiates them, so that once one of these qualities is in place, there is no room for the other; since there is no way for the two qualities to co-exist in the same part of a surface or area, a red item can become green only if the green replaces the red (1998, 108) .
This ability to articulate the content of a rational intuition is not peculiar to the red-green case; for BonJour remarks that one can give similar accounts of other rational insights (1998, 108) .
To what extent is rational insight autonomous or singular, capable of justifying a claim 'all by itself'? Plantinga's characterization has the virtue of rendering the autonomy of rational insights intelligible; one has a thought accompanied by an indescribable feel that things have to be this way and couldn't have been otherwise. This bare conviction need not be articulated to any extent at all to justify belief. Yet BonJour resists this line because it makes it difcult to understand how one could be justied in believing on the basis of indescribable feels. However, BonJour distinguishes his view only at the cost of signicantly muddying the waters. Given what he says about how it is possible to articulate the content of the intuition, it is hard to recover the thought that a rational insight can stand alone and still justify. What's more, one natural paraphrase of BonJour's remark that he is 'able to articulate this insight' is that he can explain the insight. An explanationist may be forgiven for understanding BonJour's remarks as contradicting his avowal that rational insights are autonomous. The explanationist sees matters thusly: BonJour has a strong belief that nothing can be entirely red and green all over at the same time and this belief ts with his other beliefs. He can explain this belief by embedding it in a story about the nature of redness and greenness, the nature of space, what it is for a space to instantiate a quality, the nature of qualities, co-existence and so on. As the explanationist sees things, all these features of BonJour's story support (to an impressive degree) that BonJour's intuition is true. The intuition does not stand alone and does not justify, apart from its impressive coherence with other elements of the story. In short, BonJour's position seems to support coherentism rather than annihilate it.
Reasoning
BonJour's third indispensability argument focuses on principles of reasoning and the process of reasoning. He argues that a substantive rationalist position is indispensable for a justica-tion of both the principles and process of reasoning. BonJour's most sustained remarks on this occur in a later section in response to the mysteriousness objection that unarticulated rational insights cannot provide justication. As we just saw, BonJour's response was to stress the context in which these insights can be lled out and articulated. In this passage BonJour backtracks and defends a view much closer to Plantinga's. BonJour focuses on the objection that singular rational insights cannot provide justication by themselves 'precisely because of their unarticulated character, there can be . . . no genuine basis for ascribing rational cogency to them -and in particular no reason to think that beliefs adopted in t e d p o st o n accordance with them are likely to be true' (BonJour 1998, 131) . BonJour replies that this objection overlooks the necessity of immediate, rational insights involved in the process of reasoning (1998, 131) . Any operation of reasoning 'must ultimately rely on immediate insights of the very same kind that the objection is designed to impugn ' (1998, 131) . BonJour provides two reasons for this judgment (1998, 131) . First, any criterion or rule that legitimizes reasoning must itself be justied, and, apart from immediate rational insights, there would be a vicious regress. Secondly, one needs discernment to see that a rule is applicable to a situation. But this discernment requires 'the very same sort of rational insight or intuition that the rationalist is advocating ' (1998, 131 ). BonJour's rst reason that simple rational insights are inescapable raises the specter of the regress of reasoning. Any attempt to justify a rule will have to provide reasons, and then those reasons can come under scrutiny. The examination of those reasons requires further reasons, which themselves need additional reasons, and so on. To escape this vicious regress, one must stop with an immediate insight. But the coherentist objects that a linear regress of reasons is not the only option for justifying the rules or criteria. The coherentist holds up the coherence of her rules and criteria with her other judgments and claims that the overall coherence of these rules and judgments provides her with an excellent reason to believe them.
BonJour's second reason that simple rational insights are required for the process of reasoning does not conict with coherentism. BonJour writes, 'There is no apparent alternative to the reliance on immediate, non-discursive insights of some sort as long as any sort of reasoning or thinking that goes beyond the bounds of direct observation is to be countenanced ' (1998, 133) . The alternative to this is 'a mode of intellectual process that is entirely a function of criteria, rules, or steps, that is somehow purely discursive in character, requiring no immediate insight or judgment of any kind ' (1998, 132) . The explanatory coherentist can accept that 'the reliance on immediate, non-discursive insights' is about the psychological process of reasoning. Some reasoning is explicitly discursive in character, but even that sort of reasoning relies on immediate judgments. Those immediate judgments, though, are justied along coherentist lines. Reasoning cannot continue forever. As the coherentist understands this situation, we all start with beliefs and dispositions. Reasoning is a combination of what you believe and what you are disposed to do. One can justify the rules of reasoning by their coherence, and this justication may attempt to justify certain dispositions we have to reason in certain ways. But none of this requires a substantial rationalist view of the a priori. 9 After all, as BonJour recognizes, if psychologically immediate judgments simply amount to a contextless thought accompanied by an indescribable feel, then it is difcult to understand how that could justify one in believing that the thought is correct. 10 observational and theoretical beliefs which lends undue credence to BonJour's strict foundationalist view of how transcendent beliefs are to be justied. BonJour's parade argument does not require rationalism because the putative examples of simple a priori beliefs turn out, on BonJour's preferred analysis, to be embedded in a coherent story. His nal argument about reasoning begs the question against a coherentist justication of the rules of reasoning and conates the issue of the justication of reasoning with the psychological process of reasoning. At one point, BonJour recognizes that a coherentist justication of the a priori may succeed in very many cases, but replies that a complete coherentist theory of the a priori is impossible (1998, 118) . In the next section I consider this argument.
Taking stock

bonjour's anti-coherence objection
BonJour has consistently held that a coherence theory of the a priori is inadequate. In the appendix to The Structure of Empirical Knowledge, entitled 'A Priori Justication', BonJour argues that a thoroughgoing coherentist view is impossible because 'a priori knowledge is essential to provide the very ingredients of the concept of coherence (one of which is logical consistency) and thus could not without vicious circularity be itself based on coherence ' (1998, 193) . In his book In Defense of Pure Reason, BonJour repeats this charge:
Any conception of coherence, however restricted, will presuppose certain fundamental premises or principles that dene the conception in question and thus cannot be assessed by appeal to it (1998, 118).
BonJour recognizes that some might be tempted to offer a coherentist justication of the a priori, but replies that 'this overlooks the fact that coherence depends essentially on principles, such as the principle of non-contradiction and others, that must be justied in some other way ' (1998, 148, fn 12) . My aim in this section is to answer these charges. Coherentism, specically explanatory coherentism, escapes BonJour's criticisms. In the rst subsection, I briey lay out an explanationist theory of justication and explain how an explanationalist may view the justication of the law of noncontradition. The second subsection addresses BonJour's charge that coherentism cannot offer a non-circular justication of logical principles. The third subsection addresses BonJour's charge that any conception of coherence presupposes the law of noncontradiction. The result of the arguments in this section is that logical principles do not pose any special problem for explanatory coherentists.
Explanationism
Explanationism is the view that explanation and the explanatory virtues provide the ingredients for an account of epistemic justication. James Cornman (1980) introduced the term explanationism to describe explanatory coherentism. Peter Lipton (2004) uses the term explanationism to refer to the view that our inductive practices are largely guided by inference to the best explanation, and that inference to the best explanation is a means of justication. William Lycan has been the most vocal proponent of explanationism, advocating it in a book and several subsequent papers. 11 According to Lycan, explanationism is 'the doctrine that all justied reasoning is fundamentally explanatory reasoning that aims at maximizing the "explanatory coherence" of one's total belief system ' (1988, 128) . In Lycan's hands, explanationism is the view that explanatory considerations are ultimately what justies any belief (1988, 133) . For our purposes, we can consider a generic form of explanationism, according to which a subject's belief that p is propositionally justied if and only if, given the subject's doxastic system, p is rated highly overall by the canons of theory preference. The explanationist holds that all of our beliefs are justied by virtue of how well they fare with respect to the canons of theory acceptance, given the rest of a subject's beliefs. For any specic belief, one may consider whether it is simple, testable, fruitful, great in scope or conservative. One central explanationist theme is that the justication of any belief involves theoretical considerations. Even the justication of a mundane belief like 'I have hands' quickly involves theoretical considerations pertaining to the fruitfulness and economy of taking our basic belief-forming mechanisms to be reliable. Explanationists stress that the justi-cation for any belief involves other justied beliefs a subject holds. There is no purely autonomous justication.
One central challenge to explanationism comes from simple logical principles like the principle of noncontradiction. As BonJour alleges, any conception of coherence requires this principle, and yet any coherentist justication of this principle is circular. Yet, against BonJour's contention, explanationism offers an elegant justication of the law of noncontradiction. The principle scores high on the explanatory virtues: it is simple, testable, fruitful, great in scope and conservative. The explanationist may continue to laud the principle as one of the guiding axioms of rst-order logic, the virtues of which lie in its accessibility and simplicity. The principle is conrmed over and over again in experience; to this date, no one has managed to both order an expresso and not order an expresso. To deny the principle is unfruitful. If there are true contradictions, then this may well undercut the very project of rationality. In short, on purely explanationist grounds, the principle of noncontradiction has the highest level of justication.
I take this to be a signicant reason that BonJour's charge against explanatory coherentism lacks a proper foothold. I now turn to two specic objections. First, any coherentist justication of the law of noncontradiction is circular. Secondly, any conception of coherence requires the law of noncontradiction.
Coherence and circularity
BonJour charges that any coherentist justication of the law of noncontradiction is circular. If the conception of coherence presupposes that contradictions cannot be true then it would be circular to justify the principle by its coherence. Is this charge well placed? I think not. Michael Bergmann (2004) has argued that any non-skeptical epistemology must own up to some epistemic circularity. Bergmann argues that in at least some cases, epistemic circularity does not undermine one's justication or knowledge (2004, 711) . Bergmann observes that it's overwhelmingly plausible that subjects can acquire justied beliefs from perception and memory. Yet given those justied beliefs, one can use simple deductive and inductive reasoning to come to justiably believe that perception and memory are reliable. Yet this argument depends on the reliability of perception and memory in order to justify that perception and memory are reliable! f o u n d at i o n a l a p r i o r i j u st i f i c at i o n e p i s t e m e v o l u m e 10-3
Bergmann's argument can be wielded against BonJour's rationalism. BonJour argues that the justication for any belief that extends beyond the directly observable requires a priori justication. Yet, unless BonJour denies that one can ever have any justication for thinking that rational insight is reliable, he must approve of an epistemically circular argument for the reliability of rational insight. This argument is exactly parallel to the argument Bergmann offers to show that any non-skeptical epistemology must come to grips with some epistemically circular arguments. Hence, BonJour's charge that any coherentist justication of the principle of noncontradiction is circular must appeal to specic considerations pertaining to coherentism that show the ensuing circularity is both importantly different from the kind Bergmann discusses and epistemically vicious.
We can show that there is no special problem for coherentism by examining a simple coherentist view, according to which a belief is justied if and only if it is logically consistent with a subject's other beliefs. According to this simple view, logical consistency is the source of justication. Perceptual beliefs are justied if consistent. The justication of these beliefs does not depend on any theoretical beliefs, nor does it depend on any beliefs about the source of perception. Furthermore, beliefs about logical consistency are themselves justied if consistent. Like other non-skeptical epistemologies, the simple view must come to grips with some epistemic circularity; one may rely on the fact that logical consistency is a source of justication to come to believe that logical consistency is a source of justication. But this circularity is exactly parallel to the circularity of relying on the reliability of perception to come to believe that perception is reliable.
What goes for the simple view goes for explanationism as well. Explanatory coherentism upholds the explanatory virtues as the materials for a belief's justication. Just as BonJour's rationalist view and the simple view approve of some epistemic circularity, explanationism will also approve of some circularity. One can come to be justied in believing that the explanatory virtues are a source of justication by relying on the virtues themselves. Epistemic circularity poses no special problem for coherentism. 12
Coherence and presupposition
Let us turn to BonJour's claim that any conception of coherence presupposes the principle of noncontradiction (1998, 118) . As BonJour conceives of the situation, before a coherence view of justication can get up and running, one must rst specify the nature of coherence. This specication will involve certain principles that themselves cannot be abandoned without giving up the coherence view of justication. Furthermore, while some principles may be more peripheral to the notion of coherence, the law of noncontradiction is at the core. Thus, BonJour concludes, a coherence theory of justication requires some unrevisable logical principles. This criticism feeds into BonJour's general criticism that coherentist views neglect the importance of the a priori. In the following I tackle this charge: the notion of coherence need not presuppose the principle of noncontradiction. Our conception of coherence is itself driven by our desire for adequate explanation, which can put pressure on the principles we use to specify our conception of coherence. I will follow BonJour by focusing on the principle of noncontradiction. I assume that our conclusions regarding the role of this principle also hold for other principles involved in specifying the nature of coherence.
Let us approach this issue by considering Graham Priest's dialetheism, the view that some contradictions are true. Priest argues that it is rationally acceptable to believe some contradictions. 13 He writes, 'I believe, for example, that it is rational (rationally possible -indeed, rationally obligatory) to believe that the liar sentence is both true and false ' (1998, 410) . In addition to the liar sentence, Priest considers other logical paradoxes such as the Russell set, truths of our own making and contradictions arising in physics, and then argues that the best explanation of the enduring difculties with alternative accounts aimed at avoiding contradictions is that the theories are true, and consequently, we have a sound argument for some contradictions.
Priest's strategy in arguing for dialetheism is admirable. Consider our very best theory of some set of phenomena. If it is well conrmed and its explanatory merits far outstrip any alternative theory, then we have a good reason to accept that the theory is true. If the theory implies that some proposition is true, then we have a reason to accept that proposition; by our present lights, we have a sound argument for some claim. Priest applies this to contradictions; if a sound argument implies that a contradiction is true, then we should accept that some contradictions are true. Why should we not accept this argument? Priest considers several arguments that there cannot be true contradictions and argues that they are unpersuasive. 14 We do not have space to repeat these arguments other than to say that he defends the overall coherence of a position that maintains true contradictions by developing and defending a paraconsistent logic that prevents contradictions from entailing everything (Priest 1998) .
Even so, dialetheism seems incoherent. Priest explicitly acknowledges that dialetheism is extremely odd. He writes:
I . . . believe that the Russell set is both a member of itself and not a member of itself. I do not deny that it was difcult to convince myself of this, that is, to get myself to believe it. It seemed, after all, so unlikely. But many arguments convinced me of it (1985) (1986) 103 ).
Are we to dismiss dialetheism as incoherent, as a position that no one could rationally hold? David Lewis appears to think so. He replies to Priest: 'No truth does have, and no truth could have, a true negation. Nothing is, and nothing could be, literally both true and false. This we know for certain, and a priori, and without any exception for especially perplexing subject matters' (Lewis 1982, 434) . Lewis acknowledges that his response is dogmatic, and, further, that the principle of noncontradiction is indefensible against Priest's challenge because it calls so much into question that there are no grounds to argue against it (Lewis 1982, 434) . But, Lewis holds that the principle of noncontradiction is not only a priori but certain.
Is Lewis right that the principle is apodictic? Explanationists hold that the principle has the highest level of justication we can imagine. Arguably, the law of noncontradiction is so central to the very nature of reasoning, thought and representation that its denial amounts to a position that denies our conception of cognition. This justication of the law ties its justication to its role in human cognition. Given our understanding of 13 Priest 1985 -1986 . 14 Priest 1985 -1986 f o u n d at i o n a l a p r i o r i j u st i f i c at i o n e p i s t e m e v o l u m e 10-3evidence, we can acquire evidence against a proposition by acquiring evidence for its negation. When a subject asserts a proposition, we understand the subject as implying that its negation is false. Furthermore, the nature of representation conrms the law of noncontradiction. One cannot represent, at least by way of a picture, a truth and its true negation. This is all so close to our common cognitive practice that it is hard to take seriously the thought that some truths may also have true negations. But the nature of the justication proceeds along explanationist grounds. The law of noncontradiction is so central to our cognitive practice that restricting or revising it is unthinkable. 15 Explanationists resist taking the law as genuinely apodictic for three reasons. First, the notion of purely autonomous rational insight is bafing. How are human creatures able to latch onto modal space with a singular act of rational insight? Perhaps creatures can do this by triangulating their position in modal space by other claims they have some justi-cation for believing, but it is mysterious how this can occur apart from having other justied beliefs. 16 Secondly, human cognition is deeply fallible. Within the history of science, apparent cognitive improvements turned out to be illusory. The change from an Aristotelian view of science to that of Cartesian physics ruled out explanations of natural phenomena in terms of 'occult' and 'non-picturable' powers. Gradually, the empirical success of Newton's mathematical theory of nature and the 'occult' force of gravity led to a renewed appreciation of Aristotelian powers within science. Current debates over the proper interpretation of quantum mechanics straightforwardly involve the universal validity of classical logic. At some level, it seems prudent to leave open the possibility that classical logic may have a limited domain. If, however, the law of noncontradiction is apodictic, there is no level at which we may leave open the possibility that it is false. Thirdly, and related to the fallibility of human cognition, it is possible that there are intractable blindspots to human cognition. Some philosophers hold that conceivability does not imply possibility, but if there are deep blindspots in human cognition, it may be that inconceivability does not imply impossibility. This view is consistent with Priest's dialethism. Arguably, contradictions are not conceivable. But perhaps the inconceivability of true contradictions does not entail the impossibility of true contradictions. Nonetheless, an explanationist can hold that the law of noncontradiction has the highest level of justica-tion, and given our current epistemic situation, it is unreasonable not to have the fullest condence in the law.
coherence and awareness
To this point I have argued that an explanatory coherentist alternative undermines BonJour's arguments that a priori justication is indispensable, and that this explanationist alternative is plausible. There is one nal consideration to address. Is it enough that 15 See Field (1996) for a similar proposal. Field defends an even stronger proposal, according to which empirical evidence is irrelevant to the epistemic status of classical logic. Field argues for the empirical indefeasibility of classical logic along explanationist grounds. Field argues that there are no clear alternatives to classical logic for use in reasoning, and that classical logic has signicant conrmation by use in empirically successful theories. 16 Field's (1996) justication of the empirical indefeasibility of classical logic also avoids appealing to the autonomy of rational insight.
one's belief be coherent, or must one be aware of the coherence of one's beliefs? BonJour held that coherence alone was not sufcient for justication; one had to be aware that one's beliefs were coherent. But then it was implausible to think that a person was aware of the entirety of her body of beliefs, let alone the coherence of her beliefs. This problem led BonJour to formulate the Doxastic Presumption: the presumption that one does have the system of beliefs one believes oneself to have. 17 BonJour later realized, though, that this presumption was ad hoc, and further thought that the epistemological issues arising from an awareness requirement could not be addressed within the connes of a coherentist epistemology. 18 One solution to this problem is to adopt an externalist form of coherentism. If a subject's belief are coherent, then regardless of whether a subject is aware of this, her beliefs are propositionally justied. This solution must address the challenging problem of distant, unknown coherences. Richard Fumerton forcefully presses this worry.
Suppose I believe twenty-eight very complex propositions. Suppose further that I reached those conclusions in an extraordinarily silly way. I was reading a book far too difcult for me and to amuse myself I decided to believe every fth proposition I encountered. As it turns out, by a remarkable coincidence there is an extremely sophisticated proof that interrelates all these different propositions, a proof that only a handful of logicians in the world would be able to grasp. Is there any plausibility at all in holding that my beliefs are rational? 19 Fumerton's objection works only against a simple externalist version of coherentism. A better version of coherentism is explanatory coherentism, which holds that propositional justication is determined by the explanatory virtues of a subject's beliefs. In Fumerton's case the subject's new beliefs have little, if any, explanatory value. These new beliefs do not t with the rest of what the subject believes and do not perform any explanatory work (by either explaining or being explained). The subject's explanatory position is worsened by gaining these new beliefs.
It is commonly held in the literature on explanation that an adequate explanation is constrained by facts about a subject. A good explanation for a brilliant logician differs from a good explanation for an undergraduate. The facts that constrain adequate explanations are mental facts of the subjects. A subject's beliefs and abilities affect the form and content of a good explanation. Thus, on an explanationist account, explanatory virtue does not oat free from the mental facts of a subject. In this connection, an explanationist is well positioned to offer a better account of the role of an awareness requirement. Given that goodness in explanation is constrained by the mental facts of a subject, there is no distinction to be made between a subject's beliefs merely having the explanatory virtues and a subject being aware of her beliefs having those virtues. To be sure, one can distinguish between a subject's beliefs having the virtues and a subject having an explicit belief about her belief's having the virtues. But explanationism does not require an explicit meta-belief about the virtuousness of one's beliefs. Rather, a subject can be recognitionally aware of the virtuousness of her beliefs. This amounts to a subject being able to use (de re) 17 See BonJour (1985, 104 the virtuousness of her beliefs to defend them from challenges and to explore their consequences.
conclusion
I have argued that BonJour's indispensability arguments for foundationalism about the a priori fail. Explanationism offers a coherent and plausible view about the justication for apparently necessary truths. Furthermore, I have argued that there is no fundamental incoherence with a complete coherentist justication of the a priori. Even if our reasoning rests on principles such as the principle of non-contradiction, it is possible to give a coherentist justication of this principle. Finally, I've argued that the fact that goodness of explanation is relative to a subject's beliefs and abilities nicely avoids the problems with BonJour's access requirement and his resulting doxastic presumption. The upshot is a coherent and plausible explanationist account of the a priori.
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